How hard could it be to get a transcript out of the Supreme Court? — Beanland [2026] WASCA 19
There are times when the intricate complexity of court procedure seems to achieve pretty much the opposite of what the rules are apparently there to do.
The decision in Beanland [2026] WASCA 19 brings that to mind – it highlights that there are now at least five different ways (across three sets of Rules) in which a non-party may have to apply to access transcripts of proceedings held in open court*.
The Court in Beanland may have accepted that the principle of open justice is a strong reason for granting that kind of application. But it is hard to see how the proper scrutiny of our justice system is helped by maintaining technical barriers that seem likely to prevent people from being able to better understand and critique what has gone on in public hearings.
Plainly, there can be good reasons for limiting the public release of some transcripts. But other courts seem to manage more simply. The High Court, since mid-1994, has published transcripts of its hearings to the public for free. More recently, it has published videos of full Court hearings in Canberra. The Federal Court, unless it has made orders to the contrary, lets anyone purchase a transcript from its authorised provider. Neither has lost control of its records nor suffered a calamitous loss of public confidence.
Perhaps our courts could adopt a less legalistic approach in this State, too.
For now, though, the decision in Beanland gives guidance about how exactly non-parties must apply to find out what happened in hearings they were otherwise entitled to attend.
What does Beanland tell us about how transcripts can currently be accessed?
The appellant, Mr Beanland, sought access to the transcript (and, because of his physical impairments, an audio recording) of the criminal appeal heard in August 2013 in WA v Rayney.
Mr Beanland, who was a law student from Queensland, wanted to receive those records to help him better understand the submissions and issues in the appeal, and to study how the presentation of the appeal contributed to its outcome.
The Court began by noting that, apart from court orders, the general law does not recognise a right to obtain access to documents held as part of a court’s record. The ability to access other documents is found in the Court’s rules.
Had WA v Rayney been a civil appeal, which the appellant would have been entitled to attend, the Court would have ‘expected that the appellant would have been given permission to access the transcript …’. (That would not have been true of the audio recording, which would have required Mr Beanland to establish an ‘exceptional reason’ – that is, on the facts of the case, a reason that was special or unusual, but not unique, unprecedented or very rare – before access could be given.)
But the rules that apply to accessing transcripts of criminal appeals are different. Under rules 70 and 71 of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005, an applicant has no relevant right to access a transcript. (Noting that later in its reasons, while acknowledging the different standard and process for seeking transcript from a civil appeal hearing, the Court stated that the discretion under rule 71(6) should ordinarily be exercised ‘conformably with the rule that governs civil appeals’.)
Instead, the Court has a discretionary power to grant leave for an applicant to obtain it. That discretion is conditioned on the Court being positively satisfied that the applicant has ‘sufficient cause’ to be granted leave.
The Court considered that ‘sufficient cause’ is a question of fact and degree that will turn on the particular circumstances of the case and the grounds advanced for seeking access, and the kind of record sought. It will be informed by the principle of open justice, which provides a strong reason for allowing access to court records where that facilitates public scrutiny and the understanding of courts’ decisions.
At its core, the Court said, the principle is that court proceedings should be conducted publicly and in open view.
However, the Court noted that the principle ‘… is just that — it is a principle not a freestanding right’, and it is not absolute. Further, it ‘… is silent on the issue of the provision of court records to a non-party’.
The Court did identify that the principle of open justice is of increased significance in criminal proceedings. In that jurisdiction, the Court considered it ought to be predisposed to granting access to the transcript of an appeal hearing held in open court. Establishing sufficient cause in such a case will be relatively undemanding.
Further, if an applicant seeks access to a transcript for an ‘appropriate reason’, being one that is consistent with and advances the open justice principle, they will have sufficient cause.
But, as the Court put it, mere personal curiosity is unlikely to constitute sufficient cause, and neither will ‘… some salacious or prurient interest borne out of a craving for amusement, gratification or whim …’.
Where Mr Beanland, in substance, sought access for his educational and professional advancement, and to scrutinise the way in which the court decided the 2013 appeal and to understand why the decision was taken by reference to what occurred at the appeal hearing, he had sufficient cause.
That he did not have any private right, interest, obligation or liability that might be affected, directly or indirectly, by what occurred during the 2013 appeal hearing did not matter.
The Court next considered whether it should exercise its residual discretion to grant or refuse access. That discretion, the Court considered, is to be exercised in the interests of justice having regard to all the circumstances. Relevant considerations will ordinarily include:
- Why the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sufficient cause to be granted leave.
- The nature of the record sought, in particular:
- whether the record concerns the transcript of an appeal hearing in open court that the applicant for access was entitled to attend, which militates strongly in favour of the grant of leave.
- whether the record concerns a non-confidential document that has been relied on by a party in open court, which ordinarily supports the conclusion that it is in the interests of justice to grant leave.
- Whether there is an order or written law that bears on whether the applicant should be given access.
- Any other privacy or confidentiality issue.
- The attitude of the parties to the appeal to the access application.
- The extent to which access to the record is consistent with and will advance the open justice principle.
- Whether the arrangements necessary to give access would be unreasonably burdensome or time-consuming for the court or a party.
- What, if any, conditions might ameliorate or reduce legitimate concerns in granting the applicant leave to access the record.
Further an additional consideration militating against granting an application may be any considerable time that has passed between the appeal hearing and the access application. That may suggest the public interest in scrutinising how and why the decision was taken is more theoretical than real, including where the Court has given extensive reasons.
While Mr Beanland’s was a ‘marginal case’, the Court determined to grant access to the audio record of the appeal hearing. The Court refused, though, to also allow access to the transcript. And, the Court required Mr Beanland to give undertakings including that he would only use the audio recording for the purposes he had relied on to seek access.
Should it really be so hard to find out and use what is said in open court?
In discussing the principle of open justice, the Court quoted Gibbs J in Russell v Russell (1973) 134 CLR 495, in which his Honour identified that without ‘… the proceedings of every court [being] fully exposed to public and professional scrutiny and criticism, … abuses may flourish undetected’.
Most people cannot attend court hearings to watch proceedings as they unfold.
For some time now, media organisations have not been the only (or even the most effective) entities publicly scrutinising how justice is delivered in Australian courts. Various people and groups routinely use their online platforms to cover or analyse proceedings.
Nor are media organisations immune from sensationalising proceedings or unfairly criticising participants in hearings.
But, as the Court recognised, media organisations are allowed access to the transcript of proceedings almost as a matter of course.
Further, wider injustices or unconscious bias can sometimes only be identified by examining the course of hearings and how decisions are made over time. For example, the study of the publicly available High Court transcripts has formed the basis for analysis of whether female judges are interrupted more often during hearings, and who does the interrupting.
To replicate such a study in Western Australia, or to attempt to identify any other harmful norms operating in our justice system, would seem likely to face substantial procedural barriers. Practically, the complexity in bringing applications to access transcripts seem likely to substantially limit who could realistically find out what has occurred during court proceedings.
A simpler system that provided for a general right to access transcripts (perhaps even without further charge) – which continues to work for the High and Federal Courts – might be something for our courts to think about adopting.
Postscript: Access to audio recordings and transcripts of proceedings is not as secure as we might think
In an article published on 17 February 2026, the ABC exposed the apparently impermissible subcontracting of transcript-preparation services by VIQ, transcript provider to the Western Australian Supreme Court, to a company operating overseas.
As the ABC reports, ‘It is unclear what security checks, if any, are required …’ for that company’s staff to access audio recordings of proceedings, including those of Western Australian courts and tribunals.
Further, an employee of VIQ is reported to have ‘claimed the identities and locations of protected persons had been left in transcripts produced by [the company] via the West Australian Department of Justice’. The Department of Justice has stated it is ‘aware of and investigating these claims’.
That news stands in contrast with the control otherwise exercised by the Supreme Court over who can and cannot access recordings and transcripts of its proceedings. How transcripts are prepared and disclosed seems to be an issue requiring more detailed consideration than just the decision in Beanland suggests.
*If you really want to know —
If the hearing happened in civil proceedings in the general division after 1 March 2018, then we are all generally entitled to a copy of a transcript (in exchange for the substantial prescribed fee): Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC) O 67B rr 1(1) (definition of ‘proceeding’), 2(2)(a), 6(4)(a), 11(3), 13(3).
For civil appeal proceedings commenced after 1 March 2018, a non-party would need to make an application to the Court for permission to access the transcript, which the Court might refuse if, among other things, there was a ‘good reason’ to do so: RSC O 67B rr 8(a), 9(1), (3)(a)(ii), (3)(f), 11(3), 13(4).
If those civil proceedings were commenced before 1 March 2018, though, a non-party would have to seek leave to get access to a copy of the transcript: RSC O 67B rr 15, 16(1)(e). That has commonly required a ‘legitimate interest’ or a ‘legitimate purpose’ to be demonstrated for which the access is necessary to pursue.
In criminal proceedings, a non-party would have to apply under Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 (WA) r 51(1)(a), (5) for leave to obtain a copy of the transcript, and establish they had sufficient cause to be granted leave and that the court should exercise its discretion to grant the application.
And more recently, in criminal appeal proceedings, a non-party would have to apply under Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA) rr 70(2)(a), 71(6) to the Court of Appeal for leave to obtain a copy of the transcript, and likewise demonstrate they had sufficient cause to be granted leave and that the Court should exercise its direction to grant the application.
