Law Society of WA

Upheld: orders for Aboriginal child to live with kinship mother

By Craig Nicol and Keleigh Robinson

Children – Orders for Aboriginal child to live with kinship mother and for her to have sole decision-making responsibility upheld – No error in trial judge’s evaluative assessment of unacceptable risk

In Hronn & Tracey (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1A 56 (1 April 2026) the Full Court (Aldridge, Altobelli & Kari JJ) heard an appeal from parenting orders made by Schonell J in relation to a child “X” born in 2016.

X was an Aboriginal child. The appellant Ms Hronn was not of Aboriginal descent and had cared for X since 2022. She previously lived in Town N, then moved 1,700km to Town C. The first respondent, Ms Tracey lived in Town N which was a remote community of 400 people ([1]-[3]). Under the kinship system, X was considered to be her son ([14]).

Ms Hronn relied upon a child safety assessment conducted by child protection officers, who assessed a substantiated risk of sexual abuse if X was returned to Town N ([52]-[53]).

At first instance, Schonell J ordered that X live with Ms Tracey and that she have sole decision-making responsibility for X as a kinship mother. The Court found that while the magnitude of harm was high, the likelihood of risk was low (so not an unacceptable risk) ([69]). Ms Hronn appealed.

The Full Court said (from [45]):

“Whilst the outcome as to a finding of unacceptable risk is binary – there either is or is not such a risk – we consider that it is an evaluative decision. The judge must take into account the likelihood of the risk occurring, the nature of the risk itself, which may vary from slight to fatal, and any protective measures against the harm occurring. It is the weighing of these various factors that results in it being an evaluative decision.

[46] It must be remembered… the Court is concerned with the possibility of harm occurring and the possible nature and effects of the harm, having regard to the whole of the evidence in drawing its conclusion.

( … )

[70] Having regard to the weight of the evidence recorded in the primary judge’s reasons, we are quite unable to say that his Honour’s weighing of [the child safety report] and his conclusions as to unacceptable risk were unreasonable or plainly wrong.”

The appeal was dismissed.

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