By Kate Wellington, Law Society of Western Australia CEO
The outgoing chair of the UK’s Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), Anna Bradley, has issued a rare public apology for regulatory failures, conceding that the organisation “has not kept pace with the market” and that mistakes have had real consequences for consumers and the profession.
It is a striking moment of candour from one of the world’s most closely watched legal regulators. For Australian counterparts, the important question is not what went wrong in England and Wales, but whether the same conditions exist down under.
Here are six lessons for legal regulators that transcend jurisdictional bounds.
1. Early warning signs are only useful if acted upon
Two high-profile collapses in the UK – of SSB Law and Axiom Ince – revealed one consistent failure: the regulator had the information it needed, but did not act on it.
In the SSB case alone, more than 100 reports were made over several years raising concerns about the firm’s conduct, yet no effective intervention occurred. Similarly, Axiom Ince had been identified internally by the SRA as high risk before its collapse, which ultimately resulted in tens of millions in client losses.
The lesson for Australian regulators is straightforward but critical: intelligence gathering is not regulation. The real test is whether regulators have the systems, culture and people to escalate concerns early and appropriately.
2. Risk-based regulation must actually be proactive
The SRA has long championed a principles-based, risk-focused model. In theory, this should allow regulators to anticipate emerging threats. In practice, independent reviews of the SSB and Axiom interventions found the opposite.
The regulator relied heavily on desk-based assessments, failed to identify patterns of misconduct, and did not adequately assess financial instability within firms.
This is a cautionary tale for Australia, where risk-based regulation is also the dominant paradigm. Without robust data analytics, real-time supervision, and a willingness to intervene early, “risk-based” can become a euphemism for reactive regulation.
3. Internal silos and culture can undermine regulation
Another key finding from the independent reviews was that information held within the SRA was not effectively shared or synthesised. Intelligence sat in silos, and patterns of misconduct were missed as a result.
Criticism also extended to leadership and culture, with observers pointing to a lack of oversight and a failure to take ownership of systemic risks.
For Australian regulators, this is a reminder that structural design and an open culture matter. Data capability, cross-team collaboration and organisational culture are not internal issues, they directly inform regulatory effectiveness.
4. Accountability cannot be deferred indefinitely
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the SRA’s failings has been the limited accountability of individuals. Despite repeated failures and significant consumer harm, there has been little visible consequence within the regulator itself.
That matters. Public confidence in regulation depends not only on outcomes, but on whether regulators themselves are seen to be accountable.
Australian regulators — many of which operate within co-regulatory or profession-led models — should take note. Transparency, external oversight and clear accountability mechanisms are essential to maintaining trust.
5. Regulation must evolve as the market evolves
Bradley’s central admission, that the SRA did not keep pace with a rapidly changing legal market, may be the most important lesson of all.
The UK legal sector has seen the rise of high-volume claims firms, complex funding arrangements, tech-driven service delivery and increasingly corporatised practice structures. The SRA struggled to adapt its supervisory approach to these changes.
Australia is experiencing similar trends. Consolidation, growing litigation funding and AI-based legal solutions are all reshaping the market. Regulators that fail to keep up with the practical implications of these shifts risk missing the next generation of systemic risk.
6. Sorry seems to be the hardest word
Elton John was onto something when he wrote those lyrics.
In my own personal experience of working with Anna Bradley during her tenure with the SRA, she made for an astute Chair. She spoke knowledgeably, listened thoughtfully, and seemed genuinely committed to preventing consumer harm. And yet it was not until the waning days of her tenure that she finally apologised for the failures that occurred on her watch.
From the outside, it is hard to know why the SRA chose to hold the line for so long, or the extent to which this was driven by Bradley, the CEO or the board as a whole. But the lack of an early apology was taken by many in the profession as a denial that there was a problem, and this positioned the regulator as tone-deaf to its own shortcomings.
Would the saga have played out differently if Bradley had offered her apology when the problems first came to light? We will never know. But I am happy to guess.
As it is, the real value of Bradley’s apology now lies not in the admission itself, but in the opportunity it creates for others around the world to learn without repeating the same mistakes.
