By Craig Nicol and Keleigh Robinson
In Meint & Lyall [2026] FedCFamC1A 24 (24 February 2026) Campton J, sitting in the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, allowed in part a wife’s appeal against property orders of Judge Glass.
The parties’ relationship was between 2007 and 2013. They married but had no children together. The husband financially supported the wife after their separation in 2013. They were not divorced until 2021.
The husband owned interests in a company, B Pty Ltd, when the relationship commenced. A single expert valuer said the husband’s minority interest in B Pty Ltd was worth $2,603,400 by using a future maintainable earnings calculation. At first instance, the Court declined to attribute a value to the husband’s interest in B Pty Ltd.
The wife appealed. She argued that the Court erred by declining to find that the B Pty Ltd interest had a value. She also appealed on other grounds.
Campton J said (from [29]):
“The … [wife’s] grounds is that the husband’s interests in B Pty Ltd ought to have been valued on the assumption that he would not be compelled to sell his interest and hence that ought to have equated to a fair value of that interest in the husband’s hands. ( … )
[32] I accept … that the value of the … interests in B Pty Ltd is a factual conclusion that falls ‘squarely within the province of the trial judge upon consideration of the opinion and other evidence adduced at the trial’ (Atkins & Hunt and Ors [2017] FamCAFC 79…). ( … )
[34] The wife does not challenge … the finding … that … the founding shareholders would not consent to the transfer of the husband’s shares to her and having regard to her concessions, the … conclusion of the primary judge… to not attribute a value to the husband’s shareholding in B Pty Ltd cannot be said to not be reasonably open on the evidence. ( … )”
