Valuation of land – site value
In Valuer-General Victoria v WSTI Properties 490 SKR Pty Ltd [2025] HCA 23 (11 June 2025) (Gageler CJ and Gordon, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ), the High Court allowed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria and an order that the Valuer-General pay the costs of the respondent.
The Valuer-General Victoria has a duty to annually assess land for rating and taxes including improvements. Improvements for the purposes of valuation are defined in s2(1) of the Valuation of Land Act 1960 (Vic).
The question in the High Court was:
“[W]hether this definition of ‘improvements’ requires the answer to the question whether ‘the effect of the work done or material used increases the value of the land’ to be determined: at the time of the valuation; or at the time the work was done or the material was used (that is, at the time the putative ‘improvements’ were made to or constructed on the land)” (at [4]).
Built in 1897, Landene is a two-storey Queen Anne-style building at 490 St Kilda Road, Melbourne, (Property) that is largely surrounded by multistorey commercial and residential developments. It was subject to a site-specific heritage overlay on both dates it was valued for the purposes of this case on 1 January 2020 and 1 January 2021. The Property had been purchased in August 2019 for the sum of $8,250,000.
The approach taken by VCAT was to compare the market value in its current state with the market value with the same development potential without the buildings on the land. This reduced the value of the land to $2,925,000.
The Valuer-General sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, which held that the works done or the material used should be assessed at the time the putative improvements were made. The Court of Appeal then dismissed the Valuer-General’s appeal against the VCAT orders.
The High Court held that the Court of Appeal had erred in its construction and that the relevant time for determining the improvements was at the time of assessment.
Further, the Valuer-General sought orders that the review of the VCAT orders be dismissed and raised arguments in the High Court that had not been put in the Courts below – namely that the property was valued at $15,629,000 without Landene on it and this was in excess of the $6,200,000 valuation in dispute.
The High Court determined that it was not appropriate to make orders based on the contested factual issues and remitted the case back to the Court of Appeal for determination in line with the High Court’s decision.
Acquisition of property “on just terms” – implied freedom of communication
In Ravbar v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 25 (18 June 2025) (Gageler CJ and Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech‑Jones JJ), the High Court unanimously answered each of seven questions of law for determination in the negative, two of which could be summarised as:
- Are the relevant sections of the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendments (Administration) Act 2024 (Cth) (FWRO Act) invalid because they impermissibly burden the implied freedom of political communication?
- Are the relevant sections of FWRO Act invalid because they authorise the acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms within the meaning of s51(xxxi) of the Constitution?
The High Court judgment runs to 477 paragraphs, and each Justice gave a separate judgment.
The FWRO Act makes provision for the Construction, Forestry and Mining Employees Union (CFMEU) and/or its branches to be placed in administration.
The CFMEU is a union representing workers across Australia and a registered organisation under the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) (FWROA). There are three divisions within the CFMEU – the Construction and General Division is one of those divisions.
The amended explanatory memorandum raised serious allegations of criminality, corruption and misconduct. On 23 August 2024, all the branches of the Construction and General Division were placed into administration.
Under the FWROA, any acquisition of property was subject to a so-called “shipwrecks” style clause found in s323S(1) of the FWROA, relevantly, that “… the Commonwealth is liable to pay a reasonable amount of compensation to the person”.
In answer to this ground, Gordon J stated that the CFMEU is not a person and not a body corporate, so it did not qualify under this provision.
Further, central to deciding the question of acquisition of property was whether any property had been acquired. As observed by Edelman J, any property was held on trust by the CFMEU and was now currently held on trust for its members by the administrator so, in a sense, there had not been any acquisition of property.
Gordon J stated, “Even if there was an acquisition of property from the CFMEU, the plaintiffs are not the CFMEU and they sought no other form of relief” (at [166]).
Steward J gave a comprehensive overview of the recent cases which had considered implied freedom of political communication including Babet v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 21 and Libertyworks Inc v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] HCA 18. His Honour expressed concerns over the breadth of the implied freedom:
“It is now clear to me that the implied freedom is too broad and has only become governable through the various doctrines of judicial justification that the Court deploys. I thus not only retain serious doubts about its cogency but am now convinced that it is very wrong. Given the vast scope of its application, it is just not sustainable” (at [273]).
